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BOOK REVIEWS
POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT. By ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL. Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1965. Pp. xii,
299. $6.95.
If anyone has fallen heir to the mantle of Professor Felix Frank-
furter, it is his one-time law clerk and now professor of law at Yale,
Alexander M. Bickel. This is not because Bickel is necessarily in
agreement with the positions taken by Frankfurter, either on or off
the Court. It is because Bickel as a professor of law has taken the
Supreme Court as his primary focus of study while remaining fully
cognizant of the real world in which that institution functions. It is
because Bickel has taken to the hustings of the public press in his
campaign to inform the general public about the important legal
issues of the day. It is because Bickel is as passionately involved with
the problems of his concern, problems of this day, as Frankfurter
was with the crises of his time during his professorship at Harvard. It
is because, despite the emotional investment, both have sought to
attain an objectivity and excellence not readily available to lesser
minds. It is primarily for these reasons that Bickel is Professor
Frankfurter's rightful heir. And this volume is further proof of the
legitimacy of succession. It is clearly within the tradition of Frank-
furter's Law and Politics.
There is, too, a jurisprudential identity that is perhaps best re-
vealed in Bickel's notions of the proper role of the judiciary-es-
pecially the Supreme Court-in American government and politics.
Thus, in describing our system of government, he writes:
Seen in the large, it is of course a working system, and stable, but in tension. It
is the tension that interests me in this volume, and the failures we risk when we
imagine something else, when we fall in with the illusion that laws alone, or even
alone the men of laws who constitute the Supreme Court, can govern effectively.
Nothing of importance, I believe, works well or for long in this country unless
widespread consent is gained for it by political means. And there is much that
must be left to processes of political and even private ordering, without benefit of
judicially enforced laws. The Court must not overestimate the possibilities of
law as a method of ordering society and containing social action. And society
cannot safely forget the limits of effective legal action, and attempt to surrender
to the Court the necessary work of politics.
1 BICKEL, PoLrrcs AND THE WARREN COURT at x (1965) [hereinafter cited as BICKE..
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This is the creed of a democrat. It requires a belief in the people
that is not to be found among those who would seek a government
"for the people" but not a government "by the people." Bickel's is
not an easy faith to keep. The acids of cynicism or even the abrasives
of skepticism can readily destroy it.
In the variegated pieces that make up this volume, Bickel is con-
cerned essentially with two sets of problems: the proper function of
the Supreme Court and the major issues of the day deriving from
the Negro revolution. So far as the Court is concerned, most of the
writing takes the form of a defense of its actions. With reference
to the civil rights movement, although he is deeply dedicated to the
Negro cause, he is nonetheless aware of the necessity for reasoned
resolution of the very difficult problems that it raises.
In his first chapter he defends both the breadth and limits of the
School Segregation Cases.2 But, while putting the onus on other
branches of the government to fulfill the hopes raised by these
opinions, Bickel asks for still more from the Court: "The Court
ought to address itself squarely to the problem of pupil placement
tokenism,' and, "It is time also for an authoritative word on the
grade-a-year plans." 4 At the same time, "It is not to be expected . . .
that the Supreme Court can, by speaking out now on problems that
seem soluble, solve all remaining problems." '5 This is not empty
rhetoric. His arguments are well bolstered by a detailed study of
relevant factual data. Bickel has another master in Brandeis.
Some may find Bickel's treatment of the civil rights problems during
the Kennedy administration defensive and apologetic. A comparison
with the Eisenhower administration reveals the vast gulf between the
executive branch's avoidance of issues and recognition of them. No
direct comparison is offered between the confrontation of problems
by the Kennedy administration and the accomplishments of his suc-
cessor. Excuse is made: "The Administration broke no lances in
Congress. As to this one need say no more than that President
Kennedy was a realist . . . ."' Was there a lack of realism in
2 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954-). See also the appendix containing
Bickel's extraordinarily influential history of the fourteenth amendment as it relates to
school segregation. BICKEL 211-61.
8 Id. at 24.
4 Id. at 25.
5 Id. at 26.
6 Id. at 57.
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Johnson's bill that became the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Bickel treats
this statute more as a Kennedy accomplishment than what it was,
a tribute to the political capacity of Johnson to make reality out of
what had theretofore been only unfulfilled campaign promises.
Again, of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, Bickel writes: "The Kennedy
administration was moving in the necessary direction in June, 1963.'7
It is implied that the new administration's task was much easier: "The
President's bill, therefore, could afford to be all muscle, and it was.""
Despite Bickel's obvious commitment to the greatness' of the New
Frontier, even in preference to the Great Society, he is critical of the
Kennedy appointments to crucial places on the federal bench in the
South. And it must be said that the strength of these chapters is to
be found not in the validity of the distribution of accolades, but
rather in the lucid explanations of the contents of the statutes, the
background against which they must be construed, and their potential
accomplishments. Even when his emotions are committed, Bickel
displays a capacity for scholarship.
Bickel's one real quarrel with the Court reported in this book is
over the Reapportionment Cases.9 Again, his comments must be
distinguished from those who complain because it was their ox that
was gored. His position is principled-it is that the Court has acted
without principle:
Courts are fit to render judgment on questions of principle, which we do not, in
our tradition, relegate to the political market place, to be disposed of on the basis
of one of those not irrational, but it may be intuitive or otherwise unverifiable,
choices. Principle is what is expected of courts. Perhaps some principle applicable
to apportionment can be worked out, which goes beyond the requirement merely
that the executive be majoritarian. If so, the first wisdom is to look at the reality
of our allocations of power to govern, not at paper provisions and statistical
nightmares. . . . If a tenable principle is ever to emerge, it will proceed from an
understanding of the realities of power, of the role of parties and how they are
run, of the role of money and of various relevant skills, of the state-wide in-
fluence of urban homerule go'vernments and of various groups and factions, and
so forth and so on. When we know, to revert to Dahis questions, "Who Gov-
erns?", we may begin to be in a position to lay down a constitutional principle that
td. at 119.
8 Id. at 121.
9 Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Mary-
land Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) ; Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) ; Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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tells us who should govern. Until then our imperfect representative institutions
are better fitted than courts to tinker with the system.10
Even those who are deeply committed to the Court's role in reap-
portionment of legislatures because of the alleged absence of an al-
ternative means of curing the defects would do well to read this
chapter.
The book is not unflawed. One should not expect that, especially
of a volume that is concerned primarily with explaining constitutional
jurisprudence to those not specially versed in legal lore. One might
wish, however, that one occasional cavalier treatment of judicial
precedents had been eliminated. In his treatment of the problem of
the religion clauses and federal aid to parochial schools, Bickel writes:
Yet when this great nationalizing force threatened to engulf pluralistic influences
by making public school education not only compulsory but exclusive of private
schooling, the First Amendment prevented, for in addition to forbidding "an
establishment of religion" it also protects "the free exercise thereof." The Court
intervened in 1925, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters. Two years earlier the Court
had foreclosed state control of a parochial school's curriculum. 1 '
Was it not incumbent on Bickel to reveal that neither of the cases to
which he makes reference rested on consideration of the first amend-
ment's religion clauses ?I2 Myths have developed that these cases, like
Cochran v. Board of Educ.,1 have resolved some of the knotty prob-
lems involved in federal aid to parochial schools. Bickel is too fine a
student to continue their perpetuation.
The Court has among its ardent admirers two very different
groups. First, there are those who are described by Holmes' language:
"It is not enough for the knight of romance that you agree that his
lady is a very nice girl-if you do not admit that she is the best that
God ever made or will make, you must fight."'14 Then there are those
in the image of Felix Frankfurter as Dean Acheson described him:
The attachment [to the Supreme Court] was passionate and idealistic. He loved
the Court not so much for what it was as for what it could be. If he felt on
occasion that it fell short of his ideal, he scolded, pointing to what he believed
to be faults and defects. For in the Court, the object of his passion, he could find
no shortcomings tolerable. He had a vision, at once splendid and precise, re-
10 BICKEL 188-89.
11 Id. at 202.
12 See KURLA D, RELIGION AND Tna LAW 26 (1962).
Is 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
14 Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HAzv. L. Rsv. 40 (1918).
stricted and magisterial, of the greatness of the Court's calling. Greatness for
this Court, he held, was not a mere aspiration, but a duty and a necessity.15
Bickel belongs to the second group. He must if he is to be true to his
inheritance. And it is safe to predict that he will be.
PHILIP B. KURLAND *
PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTER-
ESTS. By THOMAS F. BERGIN AND PAUL G. HASKELL. The
Foundation Press, Inc., Brooklyn, 1966. Pp. 237. $6.00.
The sole function of the book, as we see it, is to arm the student, in advance
of in-depth case analysis in class, with language and concept tools necessary to
cope with the cases .... Our hope is that by the time a student has carefully
read (and perhaps once re-read) an assigned part of the book, the teacher may
safely assume that it is unnecessary to cover the same material in the classroom.
By the use of this book in our own first-year property courses, we expect to free
from 12 to 20 hours for serious work with cases.1
This prefatory statement suggests much of the nature of the new
Bergin and Haskell text.
Lest this quotation be taken to suggest that the book's utility to
students-and hence to teachers-is limited to the usual varieties of
first-year property courses, this review will begin with a quick summary
of the subject-matter coverage. The book is divided into two parts.
Part I, consisting of four chapters and 122 pages, is essentially a
description of our system of estates in land and its historical develop-
ment. Part II, five chapters running 115 pages, deals with what might
be called modem future interest law. Included are constructional
problems, powers of appointment, and the rule against perpetuities.
Teachers who might assign or recommend this book should be aware
of its possible use not only as an aid in a basic property course but
also thereafter as an aid to the study of future interests in a separate
offering or in an integrated course covering decedents' estates and
trusts.
Inasmuch as this book was written for law students and is designed
15 382 U.S. at xxviii (1965) (resolution of the bar of the Supreme Court).
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
I BERGim & HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FuruRE INTERESTS at ix (1966)
[hereinafter cited as BRGIN & HASKELL].
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